

---

# *In Theory*

## Bargaining Over How to Bargain in Labor-Management Negotiations

*Joel E. Cutcher-Gershenfeld*

Training people in interest-based bargaining has become a big business, where literally thousands of seminar participants each year learn how to become better at finding “win-win” or mutual-gains solutions to conflict through “principled negotiations” (Fisher and Ury 1981; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Even in labor relations, where the institutions of negotiation are perhaps most deeply rooted and highly codified, many traditionalists are learning and experimenting with interest-based approaches to bargaining. The experience with interest-based bargaining thus far has been very powerful in revealing limitations of traditional approaches to labor negotiations. But the interest-based experiments themselves have produced mixed results (see, for example, Susskind and Landry 1991; Friedman 1992; Hunter and McKersie 1992).<sup>1</sup>

A close look at the interest-based experiments in labor relations reveals that adversarial institutional patterns have often been rejected in favor of more collaborative, problem-solving techniques without a full appreciation of the underlying reasons for the establishment of the original institutional patterns. Some behaviors that are dysfunctional from an interest-based point of view (for example, channelling all dialogue through the chief negotiator) can serve an essential institutional purpose (such as helping leaders manage internal splits on a negotiating team). My aim in this article is to point toward a synthesis between the new, interest-based techniques and the traditional institutional practices.

I shall focus on the training of labor negotiators since it is during training that interest-based bargaining principles are codified, communicated, learned and then put into practice. The field of labor relations is a fertile arena for comparison since thousands of new bargaining teams are elected (labor) or selected (management) every year and trained — either by more experienced members of their bargaining teams, by their international union or parent corporation, by

---

**Joel E. Cutcher-Gershenfeld** is an Associate Professor in the School of Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State University. His mailing address is 429 South Kedzie Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.

university-based labor and management extension programs, or by external consultants. The majority of the training is still oriented toward the traditional, "arm's length" model of negotiation. However, independent consultants, university educators, and federal or state mediators in growing numbers are providing training around interest-based, problem-solving models of negotiation. Throughout this article, stylized, prototypical models of traditional and interest-based training will be compared.<sup>2</sup>

My analysis rests on three sources of data. First, I have incorporated concepts from training manuals and materials used both in traditional and interest-based training programs.<sup>3</sup> Second, while conducting research on new developments in labor negotiations (Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and McKersie forthcoming), negotiation training was included as one area for field data collection. Finally, key points in this article derive from my personal experience as a participant and as an instructor in dozens of traditional and interest-based labor negotiations training programs.

### Differences in Training Programs

The core lessons taught to participants in either traditional or interest-based training programs can be organized into three broad categories: the philosophy and assumptions that negotiators bring to the table; techniques of the bargaining process; and the structure of negotiations. Tables 1, 2, and 3 offer general summaries of the lessons taught in each category.

**Table 1**  
**Differences in Philosophy and Assumptions**

	<b>Traditional Labor Negotiations Training</b>	<b>Interest-Based Labor Negotiations Training</b>
<b>Underlying Approach</b>	It's a chess game or a battle —with opening moves, a middle game, and an end game.	It's a set of problems to be mutually defined, explored and resolved.
<b>Assumptions about the Interests of Labor and Management</b>	Though areas of common agreement may be found, the fundamental interests of labor and management are assumed to be in conflict with one another.	Though disagreements may surface, the fundamental interests of labor and management are assumed to be complementary with one another.
<b>Assumptions about the Rules of the Game</b>	The rules are mutually understood based on tacit agreements and only discussed to correct violations.	A new set of rules are presented for each side to "buy into" via an explicit agreement.

In traditional training programs, collective bargaining is viewed as a chess game or a battle, in contrast to the interest-based approach, which is premised on problem solving. These alternative philosophies derive from two very different assumptions about the interests of labor and management — either they are seen as conflictual in nature or complementary. Finally, if bargainers are taught anything about the “rules of the game” in traditional negotiations, it is to enforce them when the other side steps out of bounds — which is in direct contrast with the imposition of new rules that occurs in most interest-based training programs. Table 1 contrasts both approaches.

Specific behavioral lessons are highlighted in Table 2 and, in each case, the contrast between traditional and interest-based bargaining is stark. Instead of the

**Table 2**  
**Differences in the Bargaining Process**

	<b>Traditional Labor Negotiations Training</b>	<b>Interest-Based Labor Negotiations Training</b>
<b>Preparations for Bargaining</b>	Prepare a target (reasonable) and a resistance point (backup) for each issue that you and the other side are likely to raise.	Identify your core interests and those of the other side; then develop potential solutions that are likely to be mutually satisfactory.
<b>Opening Negotiations</b>	Take opening positions that are high/low enough so that you will have room to move; emphasize forces that make it difficult for you to move from the opening position.	Avoid taking initial positions; clarify your core interests and your understanding of the other side's core interests; emphasize flexibility and creativity in addressing these interests.
<b>Movement on Issues during Bargaining</b>	Gradual movement on the basis of reciprocity and delay tactics; occasional rapid movement as a result of logrolling and powertactics.	Gradual building of shared understandings on the basis of logic, research, analysis and persuasion; occasional rapid movement as a result of brainstorming.
<b>Interpersonal Communication</b>	Take careful notes on everything that is said; only restate points where you agree with what the other side said; use confrontation to press key points and destabilize the other side.	Use paraphrasing and active listening skills to ensure that you have accurately heard what was said; use confrontation to surface underlying feelings and interests.

**Table 2 continued**

<p><b>Coming to Agreement</b></p>	<p>Either increased openness and problem-solving at the eleventh hour when final tradeoffs are made and the full agreement is assembled or the parties come to impasse, followed by a strike, lockout, or implemented agreement.</p>	<p>Either the problem-solving tone continues until all issues are resolved (possibly extending past contract expiration deadlines) or the problem-solving tone is set aside for any distributive tradeoffs necessary to reach agreement.</p>
<p><b>Ratifying the Contract</b></p>	<p>The union must persuade the membership that this is the best possible agreement under the circumstances; ratification is a measure of which side "won" (with a low vote being a victory for management and a high vote being a victory for labor).</p>	<p>Both sides must persuade all of their constituents that the agreement is mutually beneficial; ratification is a vote of confidence for both sides (with a high vote promising smoother implementation for both sides).</p>

traditional setting of target and resistance points, interest-based bargainers are taught to analyze underlying interests. Instead of extreme opening positions, the interest-based bargainer is supposed to begin with issue clarification and investigation. During bargaining, the movement will vary between gradual and rapid in both cases, but with very different driving forces. Communication in traditional bargaining is harnessed for tactical advantage while interest-based bargainers are taught to use communications techniques as an aid to problem solving.

Both processes may involve an eleventh hour rush to agreement, and both may extend negotiations past the contract expiration date — but again for very different reasons. In traditional negotiations, the ratification is a measure of who won, in contrast to being a source of joint validation for both sides in interest-based bargaining.

Sharply contrasting lessons about the structure of bargaining are presented in Table 3. In traditional negotiations, participants are taught always to channel communications through the chief negotiator, which sharply contrasts with the multiple open channels associated with the interest-based approach. Similarly, off-line meetings between labor and management in the traditional model primarily occur as private, sidebar meetings of chief negotiators; in the interest-based approach, there is extensive off-line use of joint task forces and subcommittees, often involving people at many different corporate and union levels. The number of participants is far more restricted in the traditional approach than it is in the interest-based approach. Finally, internal differences are concealed in the traditional model (to protect against divide-and-conquer tactics), while the appreciation for diversity and mutual commitment to building consensus characterizes interest-based bargaining.

**Table 3**  
**Differences in the Structure of Negotiations**

	<b>Traditional Labor Negotiations Training</b>	<b>Interest-Based Labor Negotiations Training</b>
<b>Channels for the Flow of Information</b>	All information channelled through the lead negotiator or the designated spokesperson on a given issue.	Everyone is an equal member of the bargaining process — ideas and input are sought from all.
<b>"Off-Line" Communication</b>	Private, sidebar meetings between chief negotiators are the primary vehicle for the generation of creative alternatives and the exchange of critical information.	Joint subcommittees and task forces are established to gather full information and report back to the main table with joint recommendations.
<b>Number of Parties at the Table</b>	Only officially designated members of union and management bargaining committees at the table.	Either bargaining committee brings additional individuals to the table based on knowledge and expertise, including external customers/suppliers.
<b>Strategies for Dealing with Internal Differences</b>	Present a unified front; call a caucus whenever internal differences begin to surface; exploit divisions on the other side through "divide and conquer" tactics.	Seek a diversity of views on each issue; encourage individual members of your team to share their perspectives and experience; build internal consensus on your side and assist the other side in building a parallel internal consensus.

Given these many differences between traditional and interest-based training, it is no wonder that established labor negotiators initially would be highly suspicious of the interest-based model. Perhaps it is also no surprise that some proponents of interest-based training would stress the importance of breaking with past traditions if the new approach is to work. Both approaches offer internally consistent and what seem to be mutually exclusive frames of reference (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Neale and Bazerman 1985). There are obvious flaws, however, in both approaches when the contrast is as sharp as in the caricatures illustrated by Tables 1, 2 and 3.

---

For example, the traditional model may have been effective during an era of rising prosperity — when the loss of missed opportunities was concealed by growth and the costs of conflict were relatively low. Today, however, the traditional model is an inadequate framework for ensuring the institutional survival of unions and the competitive survival of companies. At the same time, the interest-based model asks parties to use a purely integrative approach to negotiations at a time when some highly distributive issues are on the table (such as layoffs, subcontracting, capital investment, plant closings, wage and benefit concessions, and work rule simplifications).

## **Overcoming the Limitations of Both Models**

### ***Philosophy and Assumptions***

The primary limitations of both the traditional and the interest-based approaches to bargaining lies in their dependence on mutual agreement to specific philosophies, assumptions, and rules of the game. Practitioners are confronted with an “either-or” choice in which neither option is fully acceptable.

For example, both the traditional and the interest-based approaches depend on mutual agreement about the underlying philosophy — which is not always present. First, there are growing numbers of cases in the United States where employers have departed from the traditional, arm’s length model through the use of replacement workers and other power tactics, in order to implement largely one-sided agreements (Mitchell 1985; Kochan et al. 1986; Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. forthcoming). In response, union leaders have fashioned corporate campaigns, “in-plant” strategies to sabotage operations and otherwise looked for ways to break from the traditional model in ways that will restore power. In these cases, management has abandoned the traditional model for power advantage and labor is looking for an alternative that will effectively reduce its vulnerability.

Concurrently, many managers are attracted to interest-based bargaining as a potential counterpoint after multiple rounds of concessionary bargaining. Given the history of concessions, however, many labor leaders are appropriately concerned about the power implications of any new bargaining process.

In fact, in three cases with which I am familiar,<sup>4</sup> the concerns of labor leaders were confirmed. In all three instances, the lead management negotiators found the interest-based model attractive, and persuaded labor leaders of their commitment to the new style. Bargaining proceeded according to the new model — producing many innovative ideas. However, in all three cases, senior corporate managers interceded at the “eleventh hour” and refashioned management’s final offers to adopt elements of the joint dialogue favorable to management, while rejecting elements favorable to labor (even though these tentative agreements were quid pro quo arrangements). Besides being angry with management, labor also blamed the process for having left them vulnerable to such power tactics.

A potential solution to situations like this involves a dialogue about the process — what has been termed “bargaining over how to bargain” (Walton et al. forthcoming). It can be helpful to expose labor and management leaders to the principles of interest-based bargaining; but it is even more important to facilitate advance dialogue (first separately and then jointly) around how they want

---

to approach the negotiations and regarding what risks they must avoid. The agreement resulting from such a dialogue will likely involve a rejection of the chess or battle metaphor, and it may well have interest-based features, but it is unlikely that it will be a pure problem-solving model.

The process of bargaining over how to bargain will generally reveal core assumptions (and associated "blind spots") about the interests of labor and management. If either side views the labor-management relationship as primarily conflictual (as evidenced by "win-lose" and adversarial rhetoric), the bargaining over how to bargain will reveal a blind spot regarding areas of common concern. If either side views the labor-management relationship as primarily cooperative (as evidenced by "win-win" and "teamwork" rhetoric), the bargaining over how to bargain will reveal a blind spot regarding the fundamental conflicts of interest. As a third alternative, I find it helpful to engage in the bargaining over how to bargain based on a "mixed-motive assumption" (Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1990). The mixed-motive assumption holds that the interests of labor and management will always involve conflict *and* that there will always be areas of common interest. Such an assumption points toward a bargaining process that is explicitly designed to surface and resolve points of conflict and identify and pursue points of common concern.

This dual orientation toward conflict and cooperation is not an abstract issue centering on assumptions — it is a very real component of bargaining. There is an almost palpable shift in the tone of negotiations when, in the course of a problem-solving dialogue, the parties encounter a point of serious conflict. Caucuses may be quickly called and chief negotiators intercede to buy time while they assess the power implications of the situation. This sort of dynamic can easily be viewed as withdrawal from an interest-based approach. In fact, it may well be an essential element of a process in which elected and appointed representatives have a great deal at stake — a point that will be lost in the absence of advance dialogue over what will be mutually acceptable behaviors when conflicts surface.

In the traditional model, the rules of the game are tacit and vulnerable to unilateral action that departs from expected practice. A key limitation to many forms of interest-based bargaining training derives from the trainer's desire to present a complete, alternative model for bargaining. This poses a high (and potentially unachievable) threshold for innovation since both parties have to agree to a complete package in order for experimentation to continue. Where there is a full bargaining-over-how-to-bargain process, the discussion of the rules of the game will be explicit and the specific content will be fashioned by the parties. In fact, there are some cases where written agreements or statements of principles and groundrules are jointly negotiated and drafted by the bargaining teams prior to the opening of the substantive negotiations.

The current unravelling and transformation in the U.S. industrial relations system is evidence of the limitations of the purely adversarial approach to negotiations — particularly the difficulty of surfacing and pursuing common concerns. The limitations are also becoming evident with respect to purely cooperative or "win-win" approaches to negotiations — particularly their vulnerability to unilateral power tactics. A third alternative has been advanced here, which builds on a mixed-motive assumption that guides explicit bargaining over how to bargain. To understand what this means in practice, it will be helpful

---

now to compare the bargaining processes associated with traditional and interest-based bargaining.

### ***Bargaining Processes***

Much of the traditional bargaining process is designed for people who are not even at the bargaining table. Clear target and resistance points, extreme opening positions, measured back-and-forth movement on issues, and rapid eleventh hour bargaining are all tactics that help negotiators assess constituent expectations and then persuade constituents that the final agreement is the best possible under the circumstances. These are the same intraorganizational dynamics that Walton and McKersie (1965) highlighted nearly three decades ago, and they remain evident today.

But the dynamics are shifting. The traditional process treats constituents as passive consumers. In recent years, however, line managers and financial officers in many firms have refused to play this role. Instead of leaving the negotiations to industrial relations staff, they are insisting on seats at the bargaining table. In fact, as these individuals have become more involved in the bargaining, they have prompted many of the unilateral managerial actions that departed from the traditional rules of the game (Kochan et al. 1986; Walton et al. forthcoming). Though less visible, similar dynamics are at play on the labor side. Workers understand that their job security depends on issues of management investment, improved operations, marketing, and product quality. They are often as distrustful of their own union being able to address these issues as they are of management. As a result, they are increasingly unwilling to play a passive role in the bargaining process.

The interest-based alternative has the virtue of increased constituent involvement, which helps to address the core intraorganizational dilemmas. However, this increased participation also makes parties (especially labor) vulnerable to distributive “divide-and-conquer” tactics. Thus, parties need to carefully explore (separately and jointly) the implications of a more open bargaining process with high levels of constituent involvement.

One aspect of the bargaining process that is particularly confusing for practitioners concerns the contrast between the specific micro-communications behaviors associated with traditional and interest-based bargaining. Experienced traditional negotiators have well-honed skills in turning the other side’s words against them, making selective statements about what has been discussed, losing their tempers at tactical moments, and even speaking out of the side of their mouths so that their lips can’t be read as they talk to members of their bargaining team. While these skills are highly effective in distributive bargaining, they also serve to undercut integrative interactions.

Many interest-based bargaining training programs feature training in paraphrasing, active listening, and interest-based confrontation skills (centered on feelings and interests, not personalities and accusations). While these skills are highly effective in the employee involvement, quality of work life, and quality circle problem-solving groups that are commonly found nowadays in U.S. workplaces, they can create confusion and misunderstanding in the charged atmosphere of collective bargaining.

For example, paraphrasing — restating in your own words what the other person just said — may be an effective way to check the accuracy of messages, but it can also be misinterpreted as agreement. In order to paraphrase without



---

committing at the bargaining table, it is almost required that statements begin with such qualifiers as "I am not necessarily agreeing with you, but I will try restating what I just heard you say to ensure I heard it correctly." Though cumbersome, this sort of behavioral narrative is essential to check against misinterpreted agreements. On another level, a skilled distributive bargainer may engage in what seem to be paraphrasing behaviors when he or she is actually shading the meaning of the original statement. Bargainers need to be alert for these "wolves in sheep's clothing" since they may reflect a deeper lack of commitment to the interest-based process.

Thus, the traditional bargaining process serves important institutional purposes, particularly those involving communications and intraorganizational relations. While the interest-based processes represent powerful integrative tools, they will be useless unless they can also be modified to attend to the institutional and interpersonal realities.

### ***Bargaining Structures***

The contrast between traditional and interest-based bargaining is perhaps most evident when one considers the structure of negotiations. The constrained and highly channelled structure of the traditional model stands in sharp contrast to the open and involving structure of the interest-based model. The limitations of traditional structures, like the traditional processes, center on the degree to which they constrain problem solving. Similarly, the limitations of interest-based structures, like interest-based processes, center on the degree to which they add complexity and increase vulnerability to distributive tactics.

Often, it is possible to establish pilot experiments with alternative structures — such as selecting "safe" issues when establishing initial task forces and including nontraditional parties at the table. However, such experimental initiatives are merely cautious steps down a road that is pointed toward a structure designed to support problem solving. As parties head down this path, they must understand the degree to which such structures powerfully constrain future distributive tactics. With more channels of communications, more parties involved in the negotiations, and more off-line activities, it is very difficult to make a focused power move.

Ironically, labor is more likely than management to greet interest-based structures with skepticism.<sup>5</sup> Despite what may seem to be clear advantages in constraining management's hand in the exercise of unilateral power, the structures are very threatening to labor on an intraorganizational basis. Elected union leaders too often define union solidarity only in terms of commonalities that can be channelled through a centralized union voice. Any challenge to that centralized flow is seen as a potential "end run" by management around the union.

With the interest-based bargaining model, a form of union solidarity remains possible, but it becomes more decentralized. For example, as many union members can be involved in the task forces and other activities associated with the interest-based process, union leaders are protected from charges of collusion with management, and this expanded involvement builds a genuine sense of empowerment. However, a high level of member involvement also reduces union leader control over member interactions with management. Thus, the interest-based structures pose a particularly complex question for union leaders: Are they willing to trade a known but increasingly ineffective form of power

(centralized solidarity) for a less familiar but potentially potent form of power (decentralized involvement)?

### Highlighting Potential Solutions

Traditional and interest-based approaches to labor-management negotiations each have their limitations. Broadly speaking, the traditional approach constrains creativity and the exploration of mutual interest, while the interest-based approach increases vulnerability to power tactics and may gloss over important differences. Table 4 summarizes many of the limitations of each approach that arise at various stages of the bargaining process.<sup>6</sup>

**Table 4**  
**Limitations and Potential Solutions**  
**at Various Stages in Bargaining**

	<b>Limitations of Traditional Training</b>	<b>Limitations of Interest-Based Training</b>	<b>Potential Solutions</b>
<b>Preparations for Bargaining</b>	Target and resistance points create artificial boundaries on discussion.	An exclusive focus on interests may be seen (intraorganizationally) as irresponsible.	Do both — set target and resistance points on key issues, but also engage in a full exploration of interests.
<b>Opening Negotiations</b>	Extreme opening positions reinforce artificial boundaries, generating positional dialogue.	Interest-based statements build anxiety over meeting constituent expectations.	Open with interest-based statements wherever possible, but also be explicit about perceived constituent limitations on the scope of dialogue.
<b>Number of Parties at the Table</b>	Restricted numbers of parties at the table may lead to agreements that do not adequately attend to all interests.	Adding parties brings additional, more complicated agenda to the table.	Bring in additional parties where appropriate, but be clear about their roles and expectations.

**Table 4 continued**

<p><b>Movement on Issues during Bargaining</b></p>	<p>Risk of rapid escalation of conflict.</p>	<p>Risk of "glossing over" conflicts to achieve consensus.</p>	<p>Advance dialogue on the risks of both processes reduces, but does not eliminate risks.</p>
<p><b>Channels for the Flow of Information</b></p>	<p>Channeling everything through a lead negotiator constrains creativity.</p>	<p>Multiple channels increase vulnerability to divide-and-conquer tactics.</p>	<p>Begin with a chief negotiator and a restricted flow; experiment with more open structures on "safe" issues.</p>
<p><b>"Off-Line" Communication</b></p>	<p>Side bar meetings between chief negotiators limit inputs and pose political risks.</p>	<p>Joint sub-committees and task forces depend on intraorganizational (as well as union-management) trust.</p>	<p>Utilize joint sub-committees and task forces on "safe" issues initially; establish clear ground rules; use chief negotiator side-bar meetings to ensure agreement on the bargaining process.</p>
<p><b>Coming to Agreement</b></p>	<p>An eleventh hour rush to a final contract may produce low quality agreements.</p>	<p>Shifts away from an interest-based approach may be criticized as abandoning the concept.</p>	<p>Utilize the interest-based principles to develop "wise" agreements, but anticipate one or both sides shifting away from the process at the end.</p>
<p><b>Ratifying the Contract</b></p>	<p>Each side seeks ratification without complete information from the other side.</p>	<p>Each side must share blame as well as credit</p>	<p>Shoulder both blame and credit, but be clear about the power realities that shaped the agreement.</p>

As the table illustrates, there are potential solutions to many of the limitations identified. Sometimes the solution involves combining both traditional and interest-based approaches. For example, preparations for bargaining may be most effective if they involve both positional analysis and interest analysis. In other cases, one approach is clearly superior as long as the potential limitations

---

are addressed. For example, joint subcommittees and task forces can add great value to the process, as long as they begin with “safe” issues and clear ground rules are established. Ultimately, all of the potential solutions depend on a process of bargaining over how to bargain so that interactions are guided by agreements on the rules of the game, rather than unchecked assumptions.

## Conclusion

There is an old Islamic-Sufi saying that “you should trust in Allah, but tie up your camel.” It is my belief that negotiation practitioners and trainers should trust in the interest-based principles, but pay attention to the many institutional camels that can lead the process astray.

Analysis of institutional concerns in bargaining (such as constituent support for representatives and the temptation to depart from the rules for power advantage) points toward a contingent approach as a new model for bargaining. The synthesis of traditional and interest-based approaches does not represent a simple combination of the best features from each. Rather, it involves a unique process where parties are educated about interest-based process and structure options of which they may not be aware, but then explicitly urged to fashion their own process that will be attentive to the power and relationship realities of their situation. They will be, in effect, designing the very institutions within which they will then interact — historically, a rare social phenomena.

The implications of this contingent approach reach far beyond the labor relations context. There are countless arenas where interest-based bargaining applications are being extended — from community mediation to environmental negotiations to internal organizational negotiations to international diplomatic negotiations. In each case, the risks associated with the application of any single interest-based model are the same; the model may not properly mesh with institutional patterns. On the other hand, the utilization of new approaches opens vast opportunities if participants can effectively bargain over how to bargain.

Weber characterized institutional patterns as creating an organizational “iron cage” — a concept that is central to current scholarship on institutional relations in organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Labor and management practitioners are exploring ways that they can break away from the institutional iron cage of traditional collective bargaining. Too often, however, training in interest-based bargaining has tended to substitute a new iron cage in the place of the traditional constraints. A third alternative would encourage negotiators to fashion their own cage, and to empower them to continue to modify it so that the bargaining process best matches the interests that are at play. In other words, negotiators should undertake nothing less than interest-based bargaining about the interest-based process.

---

## NOTES

1. The term "interest-based" bargaining is used in this article, though it refers to the same phenomena that others term "win-win" or "mutual gains" bargaining.

2. Obviously, this article presents stylized, prototypical portraits of traditional and interest-based approaches to the training of labor negotiators — what Weber (1949) termed "ideal types." The advantage of these simplified characterizations of social phenomena is that they allow for exactly the type of comparison made in this article. A key limitation, however, is that reality is complex and no one training program will exactly match either portrait. Thus, the potential value of this article lies not in its exact prescriptions about any particular program, but in the degree to which it stimulates review and dialogue about features of both traditional and interest-based programs.

3. Many of the formulations of traditional and mutual gains approaches are derived from secondary materials used by the Labor Education Program and the Personnel Management Program Service, both at the School of Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State University, and from training materials used by Jerome Barrett, Lawrence Susskind, Charles Heckscher, Robert McKersie, Raymond Friedman, and Donald Power.

4. In two of the cases I was directly involved as a third party — one in the telecommunications industry and one in a household consumer products firm. The third case involved another telecommunications firm.

5. At least that has been my experience — management has more often been the moving party exploring an interest-based alternative.

6. Note that the items in Table 4 are drawn from items concerning stages in the bargaining process that were in Tables 3 and 4.

## REFERENCES

- Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J. 1990. The impact on economic performance of a transformation in workplace relations. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 44(2): 241-260.
- Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J., P. McHugh, and D. Power. Forthcoming. Collective bargaining in smaller firms: Preliminary evidence of fundamental change. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*.
- DiMaggio, P. J. and W. W. Powell. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review* 48 (2): 147-160.
- Fisher, R., W. L. Ury, and B. Patton. 1991. *Getting to YES: Negotiating agreement without giving in*, 2nd ed. New York: Penguin.
- Friedman, R. 1992. From theory to practice: Critical choices for mutual gains' training. *Negotiation Journal* 8(2): 91-98.
- Heckscher, C. 1988. *The new unionism: Employee involvement in the changing corporation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hunter, L. and R. McKersie. 1992. Can mutual gains' training change labor-management relationships? *Negotiation Journal* 8(4): 319-330.
- Kochan, T., H. Katz, and R. McKersie. 1986. *The transformation of American industrial relations*. New York: Basic Books.
- Neale, M. and M. Bazerman. 1985. The effects of framing and negotiator overconfidence on bargaining behaviors and outcomes. *Academy of Management Journal* 28(1): 34-49.
- Nisbett, R. and L. Ross. 1980. *Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgement*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Mitchell, D. 1985. Shifting norms in wage determination. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2: 575-608.
- Susskind, L. E. and J. Cruikshank. 1987. *Breaking the impasse: Consensual approaches to resolving public disputes*. New York: Basic Books.
- Susskind, L. E. and E. M. Landry. 1991. Implementing a mutual gains approach to collective bargaining. *Negotiation Journal* 7 (1): 5-10.
- Walton, R., J. Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and R. McKersie. forthcoming. *Strategic negotiations: a theory of change in labor-management relations*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Walton, R. and R. McKersie. 1965. *A behavioral theory of labor negotiations*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Weber, M. 1949. *The methodology of the social sciences*, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. New York: The Free Press.