Donor Coordination and Commitment in Peacebuilding

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There is no doubt that close coordination between the political and security side of peacebuilding and the economic and social side is necessary. Some of the security – development links are obvious, and we have been talking about them for some time. Conflict is both a cause and consequence of poverty and low incomes. A basic level of security is necessary for larger capital development programs to operate. Reintegration programs must be in place to make disarmament and demobilization stick. Employment initiatives and the provision of basic services can be crucial to foster political stabilization.

Some of the links are less obvious, however. Even the most practical development programs may have peace-building implications – which areas of a country are first connected by road rehabilitation or receive health and education services, or who among national counterparts are consulted on aid programs, for example, may have significant implications for a peace-building process. Stemming the economic rents which fuel conflict – control of revenues from natural resources, border posts or transit trade, for example – may require concerted action from political and diplomatic actors, peacekeeping missions and economic agencies like the Bank. SSR and DDR programs may require higher initial government budgets before they generate a peace dividend – and issues such as security sector payroll, which can often be a bottleneck to peace-building, require collaboration between security and development actors.

Hence recovery in these situations will generally require addressing peace, security and development issues together, and is likely to require much closer cooperation between diplomatic, defense and development actors in the international community has been the case in the past. This is not straightforward. These actors do not share a common language or culture. Defense actors sometimes feel diplomatic and development colleagues are slow to act and impractical; diplomatic staff can feel that the other two constituencies are naïve; development actors sometimes believe that others tend to be too
focused on short-term measures and insufficiently engaged with the root causes of conflict and long term solutions. But this collaboration is crucial— the Peace-Building Commission is an important step, and an important test for us all, in finding a way to work more closely together.

What have we learnt about donor commitment and coordination in fragile war-to-peace transitions?

First, national ownership of recovery strategies and a focus on building national institutions is indispensable. Without national ownership, the best-laid technical plans and priorities will often be unworkable on the ground. We also need to focus more than we have in the past on building state institutions. Results delivered purely by international agencies may lose an opportunity to improve capacity and accountability – and thus build legitimacy – in the state. And without state institutions which are capable, accountable and perceived by the population as legitimate, there is no sustainable exit for international peace-keeping and peace support operations.

Second, strategies need to take account of lessons learned from other countries and have buy-in from the major international partners. Without this buy-in, national recovery strategies can become empty documents which are presented at donor meetings but do not guide program decisions by the major donors – and donor funds may not come through at the right time or in the right form to achieve the objectives set. In this sense, recovery strategies are perhaps best seen as a compact between national leadership and the international community, as has been developed in Afghanistan, with clear commitments and responsibilities on both sides.

Third, a clear operational plan focused on peace-building goals is crucial. Progress has been made towards putting in place clear time-bound plans which span the political, security, economic and social spectrum – such as the Results-Based Transitional Framework in Liberia – but since the elaboration of these strategies is supported primarily by development actors, the political and security side is sometimes
underdeveloped. There is still too little integration between planning for peace-keeping missions, humanitarian planning and reconstruction planning. It should be possible to bring these closer together – in fact military doctrine on end states and effects has its corollary in development thinking on vision, results and outcomes – but we still have a way to go to do so.

Fourth, funds need to be available quickly and flexibly. Post-conflict peace-building situations often present considerable flux in the environment – there is a need for capacity to reprogram assistance quickly in response to emerging priorities. Many bilateral donors have established facilities to do this. At the Bank, we have established small quick-disbursing facilities to get funds out quickly for urgent service delivery and assistance to institution-building – but the majority of our larger finance still takes longer, and we are revising our emergency procedures to try to ensure that, when countries are ready, we can provide the right support quickly.

Fifth, donors and international actors need to stay committed for the long-term. 50% of post-conflict countries fall back into conflict within 10 years. We see at present in Timor-Leste the enormous fragility which pertains even six years after the original crisis. Recent research from Paul Collier at Oxford indicates that the period immediate after the first post-conflict election may actually have a higher risk of conflict than the preceding years. Yet investments by the international community still tend to be disproportionately focused on the period immediately after a conflict. This also applies to our coordination mechanisms – we have fairly well-tested mechanisms for joint planning, core contact groups and donor coordination immediately after a conflict, but fewer lessons learned on how to adapt these to later transitions after elections, where a new government is in place but the situation may still be fragile.

Sixth, some countries receive much higher support than others. Areas such as the Balkans and Timor have received per capita aid disbursements in excess of USD 200 per annum – while commitments in DRC are less than USD 6 per annum.
Last, international coordination mechanisms need to be inclusive to foster consensus between all major international actors. Coordination mechanisms and processes between the OECD actors are well developed. But these do not always sufficiently take account of regional organizations, who as we have seen in situations such as Liberia, can play a crucial role in providing understanding of local dynamics and ensuring close and frank dialogue between the international community and national leadership. Non-OECD donors can also play an important role in fragile peace-building situations, but are not always as closely involved in international coordination mechanisms. In this sense the membership of the peace-building commission can provide a real opportunity to foster broader consensus – the challenge will be to harness all the different capacities and perspectives involved to reach consensus on concrete actions which can be taken in support of peace-building goals.