IS COHERENCE A TROJAN HORSE FOR THE POLITICIZATION OF AID?

POLICY COHERENCE IN FRAGILE STATES

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For

Fragile States, Dangerous States and Failed States: How to Implement the International Policy Statement in Response?

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**Is coherence a Trojan horse for the politicization of aid?**
**Policy coherence in fragile states**

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_The substantive subordination of humanitarian action to political strategies linked to the global war on terror and the use of aid as a tool for the foreign policy objectives of the remaining superpower and its allies does not bode well for principled humanitarianism._

--Larry Minear, Tufts University

**Introduction**

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 catalyzed a significant shift in global security thinking. The role of the Afghani government in enabling the attacks made clear that other powerful states were no longer the principle threats to western countries. Rather, weak and poor states came to be perceived as the new threats to global security. Interventions in these “failed and fragile” states, in the form of development assistance, military assistance, and even outright armed intervention, became security priorities. Coherence for the various interventions became whole-of-government priorities.\(^1\)

While state fragility, and donor roles in that regard, are the issue-of-the-day in the post-911 era, the question of policy coherence has long been debated in policy circles. Particularly in the international realm, Canada’s advancement of several, often conflicting, agendas on the world’s stage has been a source of concern. Development advocates, for example, have urged coherence in response to a lack of consistency between Canada’s development policies for poverty reduction and its role in the global trade and investment regime; humanitarians have pushed coherence in order to lift up human rights and humanitarian concerns in the context of multidimensional peace missions.\(^2\)

\(^1\) For more on trends in security and development, see CCIC’s paper, “the Post 9-11 Security Agenda and Canadian Foreign Policy: Implications for The Global South?” [http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_peace_2005-06_post_911_background_paper.pdf](http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_peace_2005-06_post_911_background_paper.pdf)

\(^2\) Antonio Donini, “An Elusive Quest: Integration in the Response to the Afghan Crisis”. In Ethics and International Affairs 18, no 2 (2004).
Nor is the issue of politicization or militarization of aid a new issue. Since its expansion in the 1960s, aid has been used as a tool for foreign policy and military objectives - often to the detriment of development and peace. Again, development advocates are accustomed to the slippery politics of defending aid budgets for poverty eradication.

What is new is the collision of these two agendas. The language of coherence backing the politicization of aid - coherence as the Trojan horse for politicization.

This paper explores the politics and practicalities of coherence in various forms, and argues for a rights-based coherence agenda. It starts with a short description of the debates around “failed and fragile” states, moves into a discussion of Canada’s current coherence agenda, and ends with a recommended action toward a coherence rooted in human rights and humanitarian law.

The Politics of Fragile States

The issue of state “failure” first came on to the international agenda in the wake of the 1991 collapse of the Somali central government. In response to this humanitarian crisis, and the need to "do something", governments acted for moral/political reasons. Following the events of September 11, 2001, however, “failed states” became a primary strategic interest, shifting the landscape significantly. Governments often now act in these contexts to protect their security, and avoid regional instability.

While a variety of definitions and corresponding groupings of countries exists for “failed and fragile states”\(^4\), most recognize the two issues of capacity and willingness of the central government to maintain control over the state. The Dutch government, in its paper, “Failing


\(^4\) The use of the term “failed and fragile” is highly controversial among non-governmental organizations, particularly in the South, as it focuses all attention on internal dynamics of states and avoids responsibility of the north and the international community. The term is used here in reference to the political phenomenon of focus on “failed and fragile states”. As much as possible, the term “persistent conflict” and “weak governance” is used.
States: A Global Responsibility”, defines a failed or fragile state according to three criteria: security, legitimacy and services\textsuperscript{5}. The US Agency for International Development (US AID) defines state fragility in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness of governance structures in the security, political, economic and social realms\textsuperscript{6}. The non-governmental Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) defines a failed state by a loss of control over the territory, internal violent conflict either present or recent, and lastly, an appalling level of human suffering.\textsuperscript{7}

In Canada, CIDA, Foreign Affairs Canada, the Privy Council’s Office and the Prime Minister’s Office have begun to devote considerable attention to issues related to failed and fragile states. The 2005-2006 Budget makes several references to the need to engage with “fragile”, “failed” and “failing states”\textsuperscript{8}; the April 2005 International Policy Statement is heavily focused on state failure\textsuperscript{9}; and up to one third of CIDA’s bilateral programming resources will be allocated to “failed and fragile states” according to the IPS\textsuperscript{10}. In both the actions and the words of the government, fragile/failed states are the new foreign policy priority.

The aid effectiveness orientation of rewarding only “good performers” left many of the most vulnerable people in the world with diminished support from the international community. According to the Commission for Africa Report, state that are perceived to be fragile received as much as 43% less aid between 1992 and 2002 than the level that these countries performance (under the World Bank’s CPIA index) suggested might have been possible to absorb. Aid receipts for fragile states were twice as volatile as those to other low income countries\textsuperscript{11}.

\textsuperscript{5} “Failing States: A Global Responsibility”. Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV), No. 35, May 2004, p.11.
\textsuperscript{6} “Fragile States Strategy”, USAID, January 2005, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{7} Louise Andersen, page 1.
\textsuperscript{9} “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Canada’s International Policy Statement”.
\textsuperscript{11} Commission for Africa Report, p.349.
The renewed attention to “poor performers”, therefore, holds promise – but the orientation of that attention is worrying. The problems of state failure are repeatedly described in the IPS in terms of threats posed to western countries. The humanitarian disaster and Canada’s global responsibilities are an after-thought. What is Canada’s intention in failed and fragile states? In whose interest will “fragile” states be “fixed”? Most importantly, what strategies will be used?

In Canada, as elsewhere, the strategy is whole-of-government coherence. In response to the complexity of problems in fragile states, and the diversity of needs in security, the economy, social services and humanitarian relief, all relevant actors should work together. The argument is so logical, it seems self evident: it’s hard to argue with co-operation.

But in the highly politicized environment of the war on terrorism, and the delicate work of saving lives amidst war and repression, coherence is not a good in itself. Two issues are key in assessing the benefits and risks of different approaches to coherence: first, the depth of integration, and second, the means of resolving conflicts and setting priorities among agendas.

The first issue, depth of integration, refers to the extent to which different actors are incorporated into common strategies. Minimally, coherence means making sure policies do not conflict, and adjusting policies where they do. Different actors maintain separate goals, objectives and strategies, and work to reduce friction between efforts. This coherence might be called “co-ordination”: actors communicate with one another and do not undercut each other’s efforts, but they retain separate identities and goals.

Maximally, coherence means integrating different actors into a common strategy towards common objectives. Get all the relevant actors around the table and plan action towards a common goal. This model might be called “integration”.
The second issue, the resolution of conflicts and setting of priorities between agendas, is relevant to both the "integration" and the "co-ordination" scenarios. In the co-ordination scenario, there would emerge – either explicitly or implicitly – a means of addressing situations in which the actions of different actors under-cut one another. For instance, if security policies conflict with humanitarian assistance policies, actors in a co-ordinated effort could resolve the conflict according to either a hierarchy of priorities (i.e. security is of higher priority than humanitarian assistance, therefore, where they conflict, security trumps humanitarian assistance), or according to a clear set of principles (i.e. human rights principles guide action, therefore both actors must adhere to human rights norms, and therefore resolve their conflict).

In the case of integrated action, if different actors have different goals, and different tables, the determination of common goals and objectives will necessarily involve compromise on the goals and objectives of actors. For instance, a development agency’s goal in a conflict might be to ensure life-saving assistance to populations in need, and contribute to a long-term peace-building strategy; the defense goal might be to end the violence in a specific area; and the diplomacy goal might be to protect Canadian security interests by promoting a peaceful resolution to a conflict. While the goals might be complementary, and not necessarily conflicting, they are separate, and different actions flow from them. As in the co-ordination scenario described above, the determination of a common objective could be done according to either a hierarchy of priorities, or a common set of principles.

Currently, coherence approaches are responsible for the blurring of lines between combatant and non-combatant in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. When leaflets are dropped from military airplanes offering humanitarian assistance in exchange for intelligence about opposition groups, humanitarian assistance has been successfully integrated into military strategy, and Afghani civilians pay the price. When development agencies use their limited resources to teach Philippine police officers to fight terrorism, development policy has been successfully integrated into foreign and security policy, and the Philippinos pay the price with
less poverty reduction programming, and a police force trained in the world’s most controversial tactics.

If Canada’s approach to coherence is different, then how does Canada plan to distinguish its coherence from the approach that is politicizing humanitarian assistance, and subsuming development assistance in the war on terror?

**Canada’s approach to coherence**

Donor governments, including Canada, are increasingly championing “3D” (Diplomacy, Defense, and Development) or “joined-up government” approaches to conflict and post-conflict situations. Canada’s 3D approach is being piloted in Haiti, Sudan and Afghanistan. Other likely candidates might include The Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Two new government mechanisms announced in the IPS, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce (START) and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) are designed to co-ordinate and increase resources for our responses to state fragility.

The START will consist of an inter-departmental advisory board and a secretariat housed in the International Security Branch at Foreign Affairs Canada. The advisory board will act as a platform for inter-departmental coordination for Canadian action in failed and fragile states. It will consist minimally of officials from CIDA, Department of National Defense, Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada, the RCMP and PCO; other departments will be brought in as needed.\(^\text{12}\)

The secretariat will manage peace and security funds, develop and deliver country-specific conflict prevention and peace-building programs, coordinate peace support operations, and coordinate humanitarian policy and crisis response. Once it is fully staffed, the START secretariat will employ over 70 people and consist of five “groups”:

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\(^{12}\) Foreign Affairs Canada internal memo on changes in the department, distributed to civil society groups meeting with officials
The GPSF will manage $500 million over five years in support of three main programs: The Human Security Program ($10 million for 2005-06), the Global Peace Operations Program ($50 million over five years arising from Canada’s G-8 commitment to support development of African peace operations capacity), and the remainder to the Global Peace and Security Program, from which the START will be financed. Most of these activities will not qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA) under current DAC criteria for aid\textsuperscript{13}.

The 2005-06 programming for the START and GPSF will include management of Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar Afghanistan, border management in Palestinian territories, elections in Haiti, and a substantial commitment to Darfur, Sudan, including a contribution to the Africa Union forces.

While it is too early for a thorough assessment of the impacts of this coherence approach, the existing policy frameworks for the START and the GPSF present concerns in both areas laid out above- the depth of integration and the priorities guiding coherence.

First, the 3D approach is defined by “integration” and “common objectives” among government departments. The April 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) is a good example: throughout the document, the word “integration” is used to describe interaction between departments and agendas\textsuperscript{14}. New global security challenges mean that “enduring and emerging problems, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, state failure and environmental degradation, now require a coherent policy that integrates security, development and trade expertise”\textsuperscript{15}. The distinct goals and distinct rationales of different

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item Human Security Program Management
  \item Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
  \item Peacekeeping and peace operations
  \item Humanitarian Affairs (to be co-managed with the Global Issues branch)
  \item Mine Action and Small Arms
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
agendas are never mentioned, and there is no acknowledgement of the dangers associated with integration and coherence, and how Canada intends to manage these.

This integrated approach to international policy puts civilians at risk by potentially blurring the lines between humanitarian and military action. The safety and access of humanitarian workers, and ultimately the effectiveness of aid to recipients, are contingent on a “deal” between humanitarians and warring parties: the humanitarian actors aim to mitigate suffering resulting from the war - not affect its course. According to Joanna McRae of the Overseas Development Institute in the UK, “The challenge of the coherence agenda is that, by redefining the humanitarian mandate and associating humanitarian action with the very partisan and geopolitical agendas from which it has historically sought to distance itself, it threatens the deal between humanitarian organizations and the warring parties.16”

When humanitarian workers are integrated, or perceived to be integrated, with political agendas of one side of a conflict, this deal is broken. Association with political agendas can result from closeness to, or integration with, military activity, whether in war fighting, peace-building, peace-making or even peacekeeping. The result is less life-saving assistance to suffering populations.

Second, in terms of the priorities for this integration, the IPS emphasizes perceived threats to Canada's security emanating from failed and fragile states. According to the IPS, “failed and failing states dot the landscape, creating despair and regional instability and providing a haven for those who would attack us directly. Global terrorism has become a deadly adversary, and Canadians are now, in some ways more individually threatened than at any time during the Cold War.”17 The IPS paints a picture of a security-centric world in which threats to Canadian lives, values and prosperity are a driving force behind policy coherence. Failed and fragile

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16 Joanna Macrae, Understanding Integration from Rwanda to Iraq, p.1, In Ethics and International Affairs 18, No 2 (2004)

17 Ibid, Defense chapter, p. 1
states are posited as harbours for terrorists. The clear message is a priority on Canadian security.

This approach puts at risk the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of development and peace-building. By prioritizing Canada’s security in our development and peace-building strategies, we risk side-lining local people’s needs and rights.

The role of development and peace-building projects is to support positive social change, according to the priorities of local populations. “Reconstruction” processes, within the context of complex and deeply-rooted conflicts, are particularly difficult in this regard. If they are to serve the purposes of creating a just peace, such activities will likely involve significant changes to, and evolutions of, communities over long time periods. These processes must consequently be rooted firmly in people’s locally-owned development priorities. A donor initiated (Utstein) review of peace-building practice demonstrated conclusively the need for locally-driven solutions to violent conflict. Effective donor supports for peace-building must be oriented with a sensitive and detailed understanding of actors for change and resistance to change on the ground in a range of sectors and over time.

When Canadian security is prioritized in development and peace-building, Canada’s plans and interests are put first - not the plans and interests of local populations. Projects then tend to be more quick-impact. Decisions about which programs to carry-out, and the length of engagement become skewed, privileging the political or military objectives of Canada over the priorities of local people.

**Rights-based co-ordination**

To the extent that coherence is not a good in itself, neither is coherence necessarily bad. There is a need to reconcile, on the one hand, the need for basic consistency among Canadian initiatives, with the need to maintain the independence of humanitarian action, and preserve Canada’s obligations to international human rights. Integration, regardless of the principles
that guide it, jeopardizes the independence, and therefore the effectiveness, of humanitarian action. Prioritizing one set of actors over another set of actors side-lines other important goals and objectives for Canadian international policy.

A co-ordinated approach to foreign policy, however, rooted in common principles of Canada’s obligations to promote, protect and fulfill human rights, could improve Canadian engagements in conflicts and contribute to our capacity to save lives. Such an approach would have implications for Canada’s engagements in particular states, as well as for other policy areas in international policy, trade and investment.

In order to maintain co-ordination over integration, the distinct roles and objectives of development, foreign policy, military and humanitarian assistance actors must be recognized. All actors and their distinct objectives should be fully present at inter-departmental tables. Information and perspective-sharing of realities on-the-ground should be a primary task for the inter-departmental table.

In resolving conflicts and setting priorities among actors, all actors must be guided by a set of clearly enunciated and consistently applied principles rooted in an unequivocal commitment to multilateralism, and to the rule of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law.

First and foremost, this means that the Canadian government’s obligation to fulfill, protect and promote human rights should guide Canada’s priorities in situations of violent conflict and weak governance. START should develop policies and participatory learning on how human rights law should guide Canada’s interventions in situations of crisis, building on their reflection in Responsibility to Protect. The three pillars of the Responsibility (to prevent, protect and rebuild), emphasize the obligation for the international community to do everything possible to prevent deadly conflict, to exhaust all possible avenues before intervening militarily, and to work with local partners in re-building societies post-conflict.
Human rights monitoring should be a pillar of early-warning and conflict analysis, and strong links should be developed between START and the evolving human rights machinery at the United Nations. Promotion of the rights of women, recognizing the distinct experience of women in violent conflict, should be central to analysis and programming in situations of violent conflict.

In order to ensure equal access to life-saving assistance, regardless of affiliation or geography, humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence, and impartiality must be cornerstones of humanitarian action. The principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), which Canada has taken global leadership in promoting, must be maintained both within the limited ambit of the START and in the Government’s overall approach to humanitarian action18.

Protecting the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, enshrined in the Geneva Conventions, means the independence of humanitarian action and military and political action should be made clear in policy and practice. Military roles in the delivery of humanitarian assistance should be exceptions, motivated by rigorous on-the-ground assessments affirming the inability of civilian institutions to reach people in need, and the ability of military assets to better meet needs.

Though the START will presumably focus Canadian peace and conflict resources in a number of key countries, the equal application of rights dictates that humanitarian funds must be spent according to needs on-the-ground. In practical terms, this means carrying out systematic needs assessments (or relying on global needs assessments as they develop), and developing processes to allocate humanitarian resources according to those needs assessments. This is

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18 The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship were endorsed by 16 of 22 donors in Stockholm, in June 2003 (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US). They include humanitarian principles (humanity, independence, impartiality, neutrality and independence), good practice in funding (timely, flexible, proportional), the centrality of collaboration and co-ordination (with beneficiaries, UN agencies, governments), and division of roles (civil versus military).
vital both within specific crises (deciding which types of assistance (water and sanitation versus shelter etc) to which parts of the country, which populations), and between different humanitarian crises (deciding how much money to put in to crisis X versus crisis Y)\textsuperscript{19}.

Conflict prevention must be given greater priority with early-warning systems and preventive action capabilities better developed. Rather than reacting to crises, we must act to save lives and prevent the deepening of divisions and violence. Solid context analysis should guide action. Given rights to self-determination and participation, local change agents and civil society organizations should play central roles in determining strategies and implementing programs for development and peace-building. Donors should be prepared for long-term engagement and commitment in situations of violent conflict and weak governance.

In order to ensure open dialogue and assessment of new 3D approaches in Canada, the Government should create a mechanism for effective civil society engagement in the management of the START and the GPSF. The Government should consider the creation of an external advisory body, composed of academics and NGOs, to meet quarterly. The external advisory body would discuss issues relating to the overall priorities and management of the START and GPSF, as well as convening NGOs and academics with expertise on the particular countries of focus for the government.

A rights-based approach is also instructive in assessing Canadian policies outside a direct intervention in a fragile state. Links between state failure and other donor policy areas, including the arms trade, trade in conflict resources, and the impacts of foreign investments on state fragility, must be made, with much stronger policy initiatives taken by the government.

In light of the de-stabilizing effects of readily available weapons in situations of weak governance and persistent conflict, Canada should provide leadership to quell the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Canada’s interventions in this regard should be
guided by, but not limited to, the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All its Aspects (PoA). Canada should use the opportunities out of the July 2005 Biennial Meeting of States and the July 2006 Review Conference to introduce language into the PoA on arms transfers, drawing on the draft “Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers” or the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Beyond the PoA, Canada should work to advance the binding Arms Trade Treaty.

In the realm of private investments in fragile states, there are serious gaps in Canadian law and policy. Canadian investments have been linked to the propping up of illegitimate and repressive regimes (as in Burma), and the perpetuation of violent conflict (as in Sudan and elsewhere), situations clearly of relevance to the issue of state “failure”. Government support for Canadian investments overseas range from financial guarantees through the Export Development Corporation (EDC), investment in the Canadian Investment Fund for Africa, to promotion through Canadian embassies and trade consulates. Canada should introduce legislation conditioning the provision of any public support for Canadian private direct investments overseas on a human rights impacts assessment. Such legislation should include appropriate monitoring and compliance mechanisms. Similar legislation was recently introduced in the Belgian parliament.

Conclusions

We are witnessing a remarkable shift in global security priorities – with reverberations throughout international policy. While grappling with new realities, we cannot forget enduring realities and commitments. Rather than over-riding Canada’s international obligations in human rights and humanitarianism, attempts to make government efforts more coherent should strengthen our commitment to all the world’s people.

Annex 1. Assessing approaches to “failed and fragile” states

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<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>KEY QUESTIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Definition of failed/fragile state</td>
<td>• How do we define a fragile state, a failed state? • How clear is the definition? Are statistics used to qualify countries? • Is the definition based on the World Bank Country Policy and Institution Assessment (CPIA)? (These assessments are done in a non-transparent manner, using unknown indicators to rank countries; the results have great impacts on aid relationships.)</td>
<td>• A clear definition will be key to safeguarding against politicization of the term. • The definition should not be based on a non-transparent and unaccountable World Bank CPIA.</td>
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<td>Countries: Which fragile states?</td>
<td>• How will the priority “fragile states” be determined? • Are there hints/indications as to which states will be a priority?</td>
<td>A policy should clearly define how it will make decisions about the fragile states with which to engage.</td>
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<p>| Policy coherence/other donor policy areas  | • Is there attention to other policy issues which impact on conflict and instability? (Trade, arms exports, arms proliferation, debt, Structural Adjustment Programs, PRSPs, etc.) • How do international human rights obligations figure in to analysis of the range of government policy areas on conflict and fragility? • Is there an analysis of the positive and negative impacts of past aid programs (technical cooperation and SAPs) on governance and stability? • What is the relationship between natural resources/primary commodities and security? • Is there support for Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)? Other transparency initiatives? Support for the Kimberly process? • Is there recognition of the sometimes problematic role of foreign investors? | The analysis of state failure should be holistic, acknowledging the external and internal causes of state collapse, and, significantly, the complicity of donor governments in said “failure”. Links between state failure and other donor policy areas, including the arms trade, trade in conflict resources, and the impacts of foreign investors, must be made. • Canada’s efforts should be rooted in the primary obligation of states to protect, fulfill, and promote international human rights. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which Canada played a lead role in developing through the United Nations, also provides a useful reference point for structuring donor engagement in certain failed and failing states. The three pillars of the Responsibility (to prevent, protect and rebuild), emphasize the obligation for the international community to do everything possible to prevent deadly conflict, to exhaust all possible avenues before intervening militarily, and to work with local partners in re-building societies post-conflict. |</p>
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<td>Policy coherence/ other donor policy areas, cont’d</td>
<td>• Is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons included in the analysis of state fragility?</td>
<td>• CIDA should support calls (by the SCFAIT in a recent report), for new policy tools to address the often problematic roles of Canadian investors overseas. Canada should introduce legislation conditioning government support for company activities overseas on a declaration of adherence to internationally accepted norms (ILO Convention 169, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, IFC Standards to name a few), including monitoring and compliance mechanisms. A similar such legislation was recently introduced in the Belgian parliament.</td>
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<td>• Is there support for efforts to address this proliferation?</td>
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<td>• How is the 3D approach couched? Collaboration? Coordination? Common goals?</td>
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<td>• On the role of the United Nations, is there emphasis on its importance and its reform?</td>
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<td>• Is there explicit reference to the Responsibility to Protect?</td>
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<td>• How are the peacebuilding roles for the UN, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) described?</td>
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<td>• How does the failed states analysis relate to international peacekeeping and its reform?</td>
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<td>Analysis of relationship between security and development</td>
<td>• Is there a distinction between the security of the states and security of people? What is CIDA’s role? Is the emphasis on global security or local security?</td>
<td>• CIDA should support calls for Canada to provide leadership to quell the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. CIDA’s interventions in this regard should be guided by, but not limited to, the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All its Aspects (PoA). This includes the promotion of the draft “Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers” or the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).</td>
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<td>• Is there a conflation of insecurity, terrorism and conflict? Confusion of peace and security?</td>
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<td>• Is there a reference to the need to ensure that poverty reduction is not subordinated to short-term political interests or anti-terrorism?</td>
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<td>• How is the relationship between conflict, security and poverty explained? Between poverty and terrorism?</td>
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### ISSUE

Rationale for engagement in failed and fragile states

- Are failed states fertile grounds for international crime and terrorism – and illegal arms trafficking – bad for private investment? Or are they harmful to their populations and their development possibilities? Where is the emphasis?
- What is the place of terrorism in justifying work in failed and failing states?

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| Rationale for engagement in failed and fragile states | - Are failed states fertile grounds for international crime and terrorism – and illegal arms trafficking – bad for private investment? Or are they harmful to their populations and their development possibilities? Where is the emphasis?  
- What is the place of terrorism in justifying work in failed and failing states? | - The International Policy Statement, in setting out the rationale for focus on failed and fragile states, put undue emphasis on perceived threats to Canada's security emanating from failed and fragile states. The IPS paints a picture of a security-centric world in which threats to Canadian lives, values and prosperity are the main driving force behind policy decisions. In the Statement, failed and fragile states are posited as harbours for terrorists; investment in counter-terrorism is significantly increased to reduce vulnerability to terrorism; weapons of mass destruction are a concern because of the potential for terrorists to get a hold of them.  
Canadian foreign policy should be clear that the complex conflicts in the South are primarily human catastrophes - not threats to Canada’s security or potential harbours for terrorists. |

| Aid and state fragility | - How are aid programmes and Official Development Assistance (ODA) linked to addressing insecurity?  
- Is it made clear that whatever linkages might exist between the solutions to both underdevelopment and terrorism, aid should not be put at the service of global security? | - Financing assistance in the area of military reform, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations from already small and overstretched ODA budgets would inevitably be at the expense of the resources required for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, sustainable development, social justice and human rights.  
- DFID deals with this issue in its fragile states policy. “DFID will continue to argue that bilateral and multilateral agencies, such as the EU and UN, should use their development budgets to finance activities which constitute Official Development Assistance (ODA) under internationally-recognised criteria, and that these budgets should not be diverted toward technical assistance for short-term global or national security objectives.” |

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20 “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Canada’s International Policy Statement”.

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Is coherence a Trojan horse for the politicization of aid? Policy coherence in fragile states

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| Methods of engagement: Development programming | • What are the programme priorities?  
• Is there a Human Rights framework for engagement?  
• How is governance programming described?  
• How will governance support directly impact on the poor?  
• Where is SSR? How is it described? What about SSAJ (safety, security, and access to justice)? Is the focus on operations of the security sector or on accountability and transparency?  
• Are programs to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons a priority?  
• Is funding for DDR, destruction, and collection a priority?  
• What is the Private Sector and Development Strategy?  
• How is foreign investment to be promoted? How are the potentially negative impacts of FDI in fragile states addressed?  
• Are children and youth a distinct category with whom to engage?  
• How are the gendered impacts of conflict and fragility described and incorporated into the strategy?  
• How will the success of programs be measured? Against poverty reduction, or global security goals?  
• Is there a clear definition of when programs might be cut off? In which circumstances would bilateral assistance to governments not be appropriate? | • Canada’s efforts should be rooted in the primary obligation of states to protect, fulfill, and promote international human rights.  
• Increased SSR activities could be a welcome development. The actions and financing of the military and repressive police forces in developing countries can be significant impediments to human rights and democratic development. The reform of the security sector can be a key factor in conflict prevention and resolution, and in democratic development.  
• In the current geopolitical context, however, increased SSR activities should be closely monitored by the development community.  
• At a project level, there are questions about SSR programming both in terms of relevance to the anti-poverty agenda, and its impact on development and human rights.  
• There are concerns that SSR activities might in fact impair anti-poverty interventions, for the benefit of donor security interests. Examples of the latter activities might include counter-terrorism training for police, training of border guards, and regulation of remittances from diaspora communities.  
• CIDA should create a policy framework for its work in SSR, explicitly rooting the Agency’s programming in this area in poverty reduction and human rights promotion strategies.  
• CIDA should work to reduce the demand for SALW through development and peace building interventions.  
• While support for local enterprise can be important in fostering income generation for the poor, support for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and market liberalization should be approached with caution, particularly in situations of violent conflict and weak governance. |
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| Methods of engagement: Development programming, cont’d | • “Failed or fragile” states constitute weak regulatory environments for investments, where governments lack the capacity or willingness to assess the impacts of investments on economies and the rights of their populations.  
• Concerns about the activities of foreign investors in weak states range from the exacerbation of divisions and conflicts within communities, to support for a repressive regime. | |
| Methods of engagement: Humanitarian action | • Is the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative highlighted and referred to as the frame for guiding responsible humanitarian action?  
• Are the principles of humanitarian action – neutrality, impartiality, independence – central to references for humanitarian action?  
• Is there recognition of the need for funding according to needs, not political ends?  
• How do we regulate the “cooperation” of military and humanitarian actors? Is the military involved only when the humanitarian actors cannot be? | • CIDA should separate clearly humanitarian objectives and development objectives from military and foreign policy goals in its approach to 3D coordination.  
• The neutral space for humanitarian action should be preserved explicitly in government policy and action relating to 3D approaches.  
• CIDA should be clear about the relatively autonomous roles of civil society actors in relating to 3D mechanisms within Government and in the field. |